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Conflicts of Interest in Medicine, Research,
and Law: A Comparison
Stacey A. Tovino, JD, PhD*
Abstract
Several of the remarks and articles presented in this symposium
have addressed conflicts of interest arising during the provision of legal
counsel to individuals who are elderly, including specific conflicts of
interest implicated by estate planning, retirement planning, and long-term
care planning. Topics examined thus far include conflicts of interest
with respect to the application of rules of confidentiality within state
rules of professional conduct to elderly clients with impaired decisionmaking capacity; conflicts of interest involving representative payees for
Social Security benefits; conflicts of interest in distributions when
parents enter into marriages that are unprotected by law; and conflicts of
interest inherent in powers of attorney, among others.1
This article will diverge slightly from the prior articles and focus
instead on conflicts of interest present in the involvement of individuals
who are elderly with impaired decision-making capacity in clinical and
experimental medicine when legal counsel and advanced health care and
research participation planning have not taken place. More specifically,
Parts I and II of this article will identify conflicts of interest that arise in
the contexts of clinical medicine and human subjects research when an
elderly patient with impaired decision-making capacity has not executed
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1. See Katherine C. Pearson, Introduction to Symposium Issue, Capacity, Conflict,
and Change: Elder Law and Estate Planning Themes in an Aging World, 117 PENN ST. L.
REV. 979 (2013) (highlighting the issues presented in this symposium edition).
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an advanced health care directive, an advanced biomedical or behavioral
research directive, or other similar document, and for whom a guardian
has not been appointed. Parts I and II also compare and contrast
illustrative state approaches for identifying and managing these conflicts
to determine whether one state’s approach to managing such conflicts is
preferable to another.
Part III of this article compares and contrasts approaches taken by
illustrative state rules of professional conduct for managing conflicts of
interest in the context of legal representation. Part IV compares the
approaches used in legal representation to the approaches used in clinical
medicine and human subjects research.
One purpose of these
comparisons is to identify options for managing conflicts in different
professional settings and to determine whether the approach of one
professional setting is superior to another. Part IV finds that the law
imposes more stringent duties on attorneys regarding the identification
and management of conflicts of interest with respect to their clients as
opposed to physicians with respect to their patients and researchers with
respect to their human subjects. Part IV also finds that the conflicts of
interest that can arise due to the lack of advanced health care and
research participation planning are as substantively concerning, if not
more so, than the conflicts of interest that arise during the provision of
estate planning, retirement planning, and long-term care planning.
For these reasons, this article joins the already robust law review
and other literatures that urge advanced health care and advanced
research participation planning to minimize conflicts of interest that
could arise when a surrogate, in the absence of a formally appointed
agent or guardian, would like to consent to the administration,
withholding, or withdrawal of treatment or consent to research
participation on behalf of an elderly individual with impaired decisionmaking capacity. As such, this article hopefully serves as a nice
capstone to the other pieces in this symposium by providing yet another
reminder that legal planning, even with the conflicts of interest identified
by the other authors in this symposium, is almost always superior to the
lack of planning. This article also, however, proposes a novel solution
for health care and research-related conflicts: state laws governing
conflicts of interest in clinical medicine and human subject research
should consider borrowing approaches to conflicts management that are
set forth in state rules of attorney professional conduct.
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CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL MEDICINE

The involvement of individuals who are elderly and have impaired
decision-making capacity in clinical medicine can create conflicts of
interest that require identification and proper management.2 As
background, in the context of clinical medicine, decision-making
capacity refers to an elderly patient’s cognitive and emotional capacity to
consider information relating to the risks and benefits of a proposed
diagnostic examination, medical treatment, or surgical procedure; the
ability to make a decision to consent or refuse to consent to such
examination, treatment, or procedure; and the ability to communicate
that decision.3 Neurologists, psychiatrists, geriatricians, and emergency
2. The introductory material in text accompanying notes 1-8 is taken with
permission and with only technical changes from Stacey Tovino, A ‘Common’ Proposal,
50 HOUS. L. REV. 787, Part I (2013).
3. See, e.g., Gregory L. Larkin et al., Emergency Determination of DecisionMaking Capacity: Balancing Autonomy and Beneficence in the Emergency Department,
8 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 282, 282 (2001) (“Decision-making capacity includes the
ability to receive, process, and understand information, the ability to deliberate, the
ability to make choices, and the ability to communicate those preferences.”); Roy C.
Martin et al., Medical Decision-Making Capacity in Cognitively Impaired Parkinson’s
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medicine physicians, among other clinicians, frequently treat elderly
patients with impaired decision-making capacity.4 Some of these
patients may be in a coma or vegetative state and have no present
decision-making capacity.5 Other elderly patients may have mild,
moderate, or severe neurological disorders, including Parkinson’s
disease, Alzheimer’s disease, and related dementias that may restrict
their decision-making capacity.6 Still other elderly patients may have
severe mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia with disturbance of
thought and perception, which limit their decision-making capacity.7 As
Disease Patients Without Dementia, 23 MOVEMENT DISORDERS 1867, 1867-68 (2008)
(defining medical decision-making capacity as the cognitive and emotional capacity to
accept a proposed treatment, to refuse treatment, or to select among treatment
alternatives).
4. See, e.g., Edmund Howe, Ethical Aspects of Evaluating a Patient’s Mental
Capacity, 6 PSYCHIATRY 15, 15 (2009) (noting that non-psychiatrist physicians frequently
consult with psychiatrists to help make determinations regarding patients’ decisionmaking capacity); James M. Lai & Jason Karlawish, Assessing the Capacity to Make
Everyday Decisions: A Guide for Clinicians and an Agenda for Future Research, 15 AM.
J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 101, 101 (2007) (noting that competency assessments are a
common and necessary part of caring for older patients with cognitive impairments and
that geriatricians face considerable challenges in accurately and reliably identifying
impaired competency); id. at 103 (explaining that discharge planners, case managers, and
clinicians in hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, and emergency departments frequently
must decide whether patients with functional impairments are capable of making
decisions). See generally Grant V. Chow et al., CURVES: A Mnemonic for Determining
Medical Decision-Making Capacity and Providing Emergency Treatment in the Acute
Setting, 137 CHEST 421, 421-27 (2010) (addressing the evaluation of decision-making
capacity in the emergency context).
5. See, e.g., Rowan H. Harwood, Robert Stewart & Peter Bartlett, Safeguarding the
Rights of Patients Who Lack Capacity in General Hospitals, 36 AGE & AGEING 120, 120
(2007) (“Many people . . . in coma are admitted to hospital, but lack the capacity to
consent to admission.”); Sheila A. M. McLean, Permanent Vegetative State and the Law,
71 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY i26, i26-i27 (2001) (noting that
patients in a vegetative state lack capacity to consent to treatment).
6. See, e.g., Jason Karlawish, Measuring Decision-Making Capacity in Cognitively
Impaired Individuals, 16 NEUROSIGNALS 91, 91-98 (2008) (reviewing studies of the
capacity to consent to treatment and research in the context of Alzheimer’s disease and
related dementias; noting that individuals with Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias
frequently experience losses in decision-making capacity); Martin et al., supra note 3, at
1867-74 (assessing decision-making capacity in patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD)
compared to healthy older adults and suggesting that impairment in decision-making
capacity is already present in cognitively impaired PD patients without dementia, and that
such impairment increases as these patients develop dementia); Jennifer Moye et al.,
Neuropsychological Predictors of Decision-Making Capacity Over 9 Months in Mild-toModerate Dementia, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 78, 78-83 (2006) (examining rates and
neuropsychological predictors of decision-making capacity among older adults with
dementia; finding that some patients with mild-to-moderate dementia develop clinically
relevant impairments of decision-making capacity within a year).
7. See, e.g., Delphine Capdevielle et al., Competence to Consent and Insight in
Schizophrenia: Is There an Association? A Pilot Study, 108 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 272,
272-73 (2009) (“Data from studies of treatment decision processes by schizophrenic
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these examples show, an elderly individual’s decision-making capacity is
not always conclusively present or absent, but occurs along a continuum
that depends on the nature and severity of the patient’s physical and
mental health conditions and the timing of the patient’s symptom
occurrence.8 Neurological, psychiatric, and other health conditions do
not invariably impair an elderly individual’s decision-making capacity,
and patient-specific assessments are always necessary.9
If an elderly individual does not have impaired decision-making
capacity, the elderly individual can receive information regarding a
proposed diagnostic examination, medical treatment, or surgical
procedure and make an informed decision regarding whether to consent
to that procedure. Assuming (for the moment) that the health care
provider does not have an interest, such as a financial stake, in the
proposed treatment that would result in the recommendation or
performance of a treatment that is not in the patient’s best interests,10

patients have suggested that, as a group, these patients perform significantly worse on
many measures in comparison to those suffering from depression, other medical illnesses
(such as heart disease, HIV infection) or healthy control subjects.”); John H. Coverdale,
Laurence B. McCullough & Frank A. Chervenak, Assisted and Surrogate Decision
Making for Pregnant Patients Who Have Schizophrenia, 30 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 659,
659 (2004) (explaining that “[s]chizophrenia can chronically and variably impair a
woman’s decisions concerning the management of her pregnancy,” including decisions
regarding pregnancy continuation).
8. Joseph E. Beltran, Shared Decision Making: The Ethics of Caring and Best
Respect, 12 BIOETHICS F. 17, 17 (1996) (noting that decision-making capacity for
individuals with disabilities occurs along a continuum); Larkin et al., supra note 3, at
282. Larkin et al. state:
[Decision-making capacity] is a dynamic . . . and changing talent; in practice it
may be assessed on a non-dichotomous spectrum of capacity, pertaining to the
particular health care decisions at hand. Often, impairment is situational; the
same patient may be competent for one decision and not another, depending on
the gravity and consequences of the decision and the potential for harm.
Id.
9. See, e.g., THE MACARTHUR RESEARCH NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH & THE
LAW, THE MACARTHUR TREATMENT COMPETENCE STUDY (2004), available at
http://bit.ly/laRQnc. The study notes:
Most patients hospitalized with serious mental illness have abilities similar to
persons without mental illness for making treatment decisions. Taken by itself,
mental illness does not invariably impair decision making capacities. On the
other hand, a substantial percentage of hospitalized patients—up to half in the
group with schizophrenia when all four types of abilities are considered—show
high levels of impairment.
Id.
10. Certainly, this assumption does not always hold. Any physician who receives
payment directly from a patient or indirectly through insurance for performing a
procedure on a patient has a financial interest in the performance of that procedure. If the
procedure is not in the patient’s best health interests, then a conflict of interest exists.
Many physicians also use, prescribe, or recommend health care items and services
provided, manufactured, or otherwise made available by companies with which the
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conflicts of interest are not front and center in the treatment of elderly
individuals with intact decision-making capacity.
On the other hand, if an elderly individual does have impaired
decision-making capacity, the elderly individual may not be able to
comprehend information regarding a proposed examination, treatment, or
procedure, or make an informed decision whether to consent to such
examination, treatment, or procedure. In this case, if the elderly
individual did not execute an advanced health care planning document
when competent, such as a directive to physician (also called a living
will)11 or a medical power of attorney (also called a health care power of
attorney),12 governing law typically allows—as a default—certain classes
of persons to provide what is known as “surrogate” consent to treatment
on behalf of the individual.13
The problem, of course, is that the surrogate decision maker may
have interests that conflict with the interests that the elderly individual
would or could identify if competent. For example, the surrogate may
stand to inherit money or property upon the death of the elderly
individual and, therefore, may wish to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining treatment from the individual even though the individual,
while competent, may have desired to have been maintained for as long
as possible in the event of a medical cure or for another reason. In this
case, the surrogate’s interests would conflict with those of the elderly

physician has a financial relationship, such as an ownership interest or compensation
arrangement. If even one reason the physician uses, prescribes, or recommends the item
or service is for compensation or other financial reward, a conflict of interest exists.
These are just two examples of conflicts of interest that are present in everyday clinical
medicine involving patients with intact decision-making capacity. In order to focus on
the conflicts of interest that exist in clinical medicine involving elderly patients with
impaired decision-making capacity and for whom no planning has taken place, this article
recognizes, but must set aside, these basic conflicts.
11. Under many state laws, a directive to physician, sometimes called a living will,
is a document that contains a directive from a patient to a physician declaring the types of
treatments that will be administered, withheld, or withdrawn from the patient in the event
the patient has a terminal or an irreversible condition. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 36-3261–36-3262 (1992) (codifying Arizona’s provisions governing living wills);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.031 (West 2012) (codifying Texas’s
provisions governing directives to physicians).
12. Under many state laws, a medical power of attorney, sometimes called a health
care power of attorney, is a document in which an individual (the principal) appoints a
second individual (the agent) to make decisions regarding the administration,
withholding, or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment in the event that the first
individual has a terminal or an irreversible condition. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 36-3221–36-3224 (2008) (codifying Arizona’s provisions governing health care
powers of attorney); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.151-166.166 (West
2012) (codifying Texas’s provisions governing medical powers of attorney; id. §
166.002(11) (defining medical power of attorney under Texas law).
13. See infra Part I.B.1-3.
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individual. By further example, the surrogate, including a surrogate
related to the elderly individual by blood, such as a parent or child, may
have religious or cultural views regarding the withholding or withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment that conflict with the views that were held by
the elderly individual while competent. In this case, again, the interests
of the surrogate would conflict with those of the elderly individual. By
still further example, a surrogate who was romantically linked with the
elderly individual may develop a new romantic interest and, therefore,
may wish to minimize future ties to and care obligations associated with
the former romantic interest. Here, again, the interests of the surrogate
would conflict with those of the elderly individual with whom the
surrogate formerly had a romantic interest. By final example, a
physician or other health care provider of the elderly individual who
serves as the individual’s surrogate may have a financial interest in
administering treatment to the individual if the individual is a paying or
otherwise well-insured patient or, alternatively, in withholding or
withdrawing treatment from the individual if the individual happens to be
a non-paying or uninsured patient. Here, too, the physician or other
provider’s interests would conflict with those of the elderly individual.
Part I begins by describing federal law, as well as three sets of
illustrative state laws, that address the identification and management of
these types of conflicts of interest in the context of surrogate consent to
treatment on behalf of elderly individuals who have impaired decisionmaking capacity. In particular, laws from Pennsylvania, Arizona, and
Nevada are used to illustrate an extremely comprehensive, a moderately
comprehensive, and a bare-bones approach, respectively, to the
identification and management of conflicts of interest in the context of
surrogate health care decision-making. Using these state laws as
examples, this Part highlights statutory features that are desirable due to
the assistance they provide with respect to identifying, managing, and
minimizing conflicts of interest. This Part concludes that, although it
cannot eliminate all conflicted decision making, Pennsylvania has a very
good model for the identification and management of conflicts of interest
in the context of surrogate health care decision making. Arizona and
Nevada, on the other hand, leave elderly individuals with impaired
decision-making capacity susceptible to conflicted surrogate decision
making.
A.

Federal Law

Other than general references to the doctrine of informed consent to
treatment and state law provisions regarding legal representatives,
federal health law does not specifically address impaired clinical
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decision-making capacity, first-person consent to treatment, or surrogate
consent to treatment.14 For example, federal regulations that establish
requirements applicable to Medicare-participating hospitals simply
provide:
The patient or his or her representative (as allowed under State law)
has the right to make informed decisions regarding his or her care.
The patient’s rights include being informed of his or her health status,
being involved in care planning and treatment, and being able to
15
request or refuse treatment.

Federal regulations governing Medicare-participating hospices, which
provide palliative care to patients with terminal conditions, similarly give
hospice patients a general right to be involved in the development of
their own hospice plans of care, as well as the right to refuse unwanted
care.16 If a hospice patient has been adjudged incompetent under state
law by a court of proper jurisdiction, federal regulations provide that “the
rights of the [hospice] patient are to be exercised by the person appointed
pursuant to state law to act on the patient’s behalf.”17 “If a state court
has not adjudged a [hospice] patient incompetent,” federal law provides
that “any legal representative designated by the patient in accordance
with state law may exercise the patient’s rights to the extent allowed by
state law.”18 Federal regulations governing Medicare-participating
nursing homes also are general in nature:
“[u]nless adjudged
incompetent or otherwise found to be incapacitated under the laws of the
State, [patients have the right to] participate in planning care and
treatment or changes in care and treatment.”19
B.

State Law

Unlike federal law, most states have enacted laws that do some or
all of the following: (i) define competency, decision-making capacity, or
incapacity; (ii) establish the process for obtaining the informed consent
of patients with capacity; (iii) establish the process for following
advanced health care planning instructions under a directive to physician
or medical power of attorney in the event a patient lacks capacity;
(iv) establish the process for obtaining surrogate consent in the event a
patient lacks capacity and has not executed an advanced health care
14. The text in this Part I.A and accompanying notes 14-18 is taken with permission
and only technical changes from Tovino, supra note 2, Part II.
15. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(b)(2) (2012).
16. Id. § 418.52(c)(2)-(3).
17. Id. § 418.52(b)(2).
18. Id. § 418.52(b)(3).
19. Id. § 483.10(d)(3).
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planning document and for whom a guardian has not been appointed;
(v) identify the persons in priority order who are eligible to serve as a
surrogate for health care decisions in the absence of an advanced health
care planning document and guardian-made decision; and (vi) identify
the standard that such surrogate should use in deciding whether to
consent to the administration, withholding, or withdrawal of medical
treatment on behalf of the patient.20 Three illustrative state laws are
examined below.
1.

Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania has enacted a comprehensive Health Care Agents and
Representatives Act (“Pennsylvania Act”)21 that allows certain “health
care representatives” to make a health care decision for an individual
whose attending physician has determined is incompetent if the
individual does not have a health care power of attorney and a guardian
has not been appointed for the individual.22
Under the Pennsylvania Act, there are two different methods for
identifying a health care representative.23 First, “an individual of sound
mind may, by a signed writing or by personally informing the attending
physician or the health care provider, designate one or more individuals
to act as health care representative.”24 Because many individuals,
including many elderly individuals, will not have identified in writing or
through another means of communication a representative before they
become incompetent, the Pennsylvania Act also allows any member of
the following classes, in descending order of priority, who is reasonably
available, to act as a health care representative: (i) the individual’s
spouse, unless an action for divorce is pending, and the adult children of
the individual who are not the children of the spouse; (ii) an adult child;
(iii) a parent; (iv) an adult brother or sister; (v) an adult grandchild; and
(vi) an adult who has knowledge of the principal’s preferences and
values including, but not limited to, religious and moral beliefs, to assess
how the individual would make health care decisions.25 The

20. See generally UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT (1993).
21. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5451-5465 (West 2012).
22. Id. § 5461(a)(1)-(3). Health care representatives are authorized to make health
care decisions under the Pennsylvania Act if the individual’s health care agent under the
power of attorney is not reasonably available, or has indicated an unwillingness to act,
and no alternative health care agent is reasonably available. Id.
23. Id. § 5461(d)(1).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 5461(d)(1)(i)-(vi). Under Pennsylvania law:
(1) If more than one member of a class assumes authority to act as a health care
representative, the members do not agree on a health care decision and the
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Pennsylvania Act allows an individual, by signed writing, to provide for
a different order of priority,26 and to disqualify one or more persons from
acting as the individual’s health care representative.27
Keeping in mind potential conflicts of interest, the Pennsylvania
Act establishes several limitations on the persons who may serve as an
individual’s health care representative. First, unless the person is related
by blood, marriage, or adoption to the individual, the following persons
may not serve as an individual’s health care representative: (i) the
individual’s attending physician; (ii) another health care provider to the
individual; and (iii) anyone who owns, operates, or is employed by a
health care provider in which the individual receives health care.28 These
provisions are designed to ensure that a physician, other health care
provider, or owner or operator of a health care-providing institution who
may have a financial interest in providing additional treatment to a
paying or otherwise well-insured patient or, alternatively, declining
additional treatment to a non-paying or otherwise uninsured patient, will
not be placed in that conflicted position.
Second, an individual of sound mind, including an elderly
individual who regains “sound mind,” “may countermand any health care
decision made by the [individual’s] health care representative at any time
and in any manner by personally informing the attending physician or
health care provider.”29 And, regardless of the individual’s mental or
physical capacity, the individual “may countermand a health care
decision made by the [individual’s] health care representative that would
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment at any time and in any
manner by personally informing the individual’s attending physician.”30

attending physician or health care provider is so informed, the attending
physician or health care provider may rely on the decision of a majority of the
members of that class who have communicated their views to the attending
physician or health care provider.
(2) If the members of the class of health care representatives are evenly divided
concerning the health care decision and the attending physician or health care
provider is so informed, an individual having a lower priority may not act as a
health care representative. So long as the class remains evenly divided, no
decision shall be deemed made until such time as the parties resolve their
disagreement. Notwithstanding such disagreement, nothing in this subsection
shall be construed to preclude the administration of health care treatment in
accordance with accepted standards of medical practice.
Id. § 5461(g)(1)-(2).
26. Id. § 5461(d)(2).
27. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5461(e) (West 2012).
28. Id. § 5461(f).
29. Id. § 5461(i)(1).
30. Id. § 5461(i)(2).
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The Pennsylvania Act also establishes the standard of decision
making for health care representatives by adopting the standard of
decision making that applies to health care agents under health care
powers of attorney.31 That is, except as otherwise provided in a health
care power of attorney, a health care representative shall have the
authority to make any health care decision and to exercise any right and
power regarding the individual’s care, custody, and health care treatment
that the individual could have made and exercised, including the
authority to make anatomical gifts, dispose of remains, and consent to
autopsies.32
To assist the health care representative in making a treatment
decision that would be in the individual’s best interests, the Pennsylvania
Act does require the health care representative to gather information on
the individual’s prognosis and acceptable medical alternatives regarding
diagnosis, treatments, and supportive care.33 In the case of health care
decisions regarding the end of life of an individual with an end-stage
medical condition, the information shall distinguish between curative
alternatives, palliative alternatives, and alternatives that will merely serve
to prolong the process of dying.34 The information also shall distinguish
between the individual’s end-stage medical condition and any other
concurrent disease, illness, or physical, mental, cognitive, or intellectual
condition that predated the principal’s end-stage medical condition.35
The Pennsylvania Act is designed to assist the health care
representative in following any instructions left by the individual and, if
there are no instructions, making decisions in accordance with the
individual’s preferences and values. That is, after consultation with
health care providers and consideration of the information described in
the previous paragraph, the Pennsylvania Act requires the health care
representative to make health care decisions in accordance with the
health care representative’s understanding and interpretation of the
instructions, including any clear written or verbal directions that cover
the situation presented and that were given by the individual at a time
when the individual had the capacity to understand, make, and
communicate health care decisions, if they exist.36 In the absence of
instruction, which is a common occurrence among elderly individuals
with impaired decision-making capacity, the health care representative
31. Id. § 5461(c) (adopting generally the standard applicable to health care agents,
codified at id. § 5456).
32. Id. § 5456(a).
33. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5456(c)(1) (West 2012).
34. Id. § 5456(c)(3).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 5456(c)(4).
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shall make health care decisions that conform to the health care
representative’s assessment of the individual’s preferences and values,
including religious and moral beliefs.37
If the health care representative does not know enough about the
individual’s instructions, preferences, and values to decide accordingly,
the health care representative shall take into account what the
representative knows of the individual’s instructions, preferences, and
values, including religious and moral beliefs, and the health care
representative’s assessment of the individual’s best interests, taking into
consideration the goals and considerations of: (i) the preservation of life;
(ii) the relief from suffering; and (iii) the preservation or restoration of
functioning, taking into account any concurrent disease, illness, or
physical, mental, cognitive, or intellectual condition that may have
predated the individual’s end-stage medical condition.38
In the absence of a specific written authorization or direction by an
individual to withhold or withdraw nutrition and hydration administered
by gastric tube or intravenously or by other artificial or invasive means,
the Pennsylvania Act does specify that the health care representative
shall presume that the individual would not want nutrition and hydration
withheld or withdrawn.39 However, this presumption may be overcome
by the previously clear expressed wishes of the individual to the
contrary.40 In the absence of such clearly expressed wishes, the
presumption may be overcome if the health care representative considers
the values and preferences of the individual and assesses the factors set
forth in the previous paragraph, and determines it is clear that the
individual would not wish for artificial nutrition and hydration to be
initiated or continued.41
Without a written advanced health care planning document, such as
a directive to physician or medical power of attorney, that specifies an
elderly individual’s preferences and instructions regarding future health
care decisions, we can never be sure what the now incompetent elderly
individual would want, and surrogacy legislation is always going to be
the second best option. However, the Pennsylvania Act does as good a
job as possible of attempting to minimize conflicts of interest by
preventing certain classes of persons from serving as a surrogate and by
establishing a detailed process that attempts to assist the surrogate in

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. § 5456(c)(5)(i).
Id. § 5456(c)(5)(ii)(A)-(C).
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5456(c)(5)(iii)(A) (West 2012).
Id. § 5456(c)(5)(iii)(B).
Id.
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making a decision that would be in alignment with the elderly
individual’s preferences and values.
Unfortunately, it is possible even under the carefully drafted
Pennsylvania Act for a health care representative to make a decision that
is not in accordance with the individual’s preferences and values by
simply claiming that “it is clear” that such a decision is consistent with
the elderly individual’s preferences and values. Stated another way, it is
still possible, even under the comprehensive and detailed Pennsylvania
Act, for a surrogate who stands to inherit money or property from an
elderly individual, or a surrogate who was formerly romantically linked
with the elderly individual but has developed a new romantic interest in a
second person, or any other surrogate whose interests diverge from those
of the elderly individual, to hide those interests and make a decision to
administer, withhold, or withdraw treatment from the individual when
such decision would not be consistent with what the individual would
have wanted.
In addition, note that the Pennsylvania Act prioritizes spouses over
children, children over parents, parents over siblings, siblings over
grandchildren, and grandchildren over other individuals who have
knowledge of the individual’s preferences and values in terms of persons
who may serve as a surrogate. This scheme works extremely well for
elderly individuals who are in traditional, heterosexual, legallyrecognized marriages and whose spouses have interests that converge
with their own. The Pennsylvania General Assembly may have codified
this priority list of surrogates due to its belief that more state residents
would be in interest-convergent, legally-recognized, and heterosexual
marriages and, therefore, that the default provision giving highest
priority to a spouse would serve more Pennsylvanians than any other
default provision. Of course, we must recognize that this default
provision will not serve every Pennsylvanian. If an elderly individual
does not have a spouse and, instead, has a domestic partner or significant
other whose interests converge with the elderly individual’s interests,
that partner or significant other may not have a chance to make a
decision that would be in the elderly individual’s best interests because
another person would have priority over the partner or significant other.
If that other person has interests that diverge from the interests of the
elderly individual, the Pennsylvania Act essentially allows the conflicted
individual to serve as the surrogate over the unconflicted partner or
significant other.
In summary, the Pennsylvania Act does a good job of attempting to
manage conflicts of interest in the context of surrogate health care
decision making, but the Act does not completely remove the possibility
of conflicted decision making.
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Arizona

Under Arizona’s Surrogate Decision Makers Act (“Arizona Act”),42
if an adult individual is unable to make or communicate a health care
treatment decision, a health care provider shall make a reasonable effort
to locate and follow an advanced health care planning document or to
locate and consult the individual’s appointed guardian, if any.43 If the
individual has not executed an advanced health care planning document
and does not have a guardian, then certain classes of persons may serve
as surrogate decision makers for the individual if the individual is found
“incapable,”44 although the Arizona Act does not appear to define
“incapable.”
In priority order, the Arizona Act lists six classes of persons who
may serve as a surrogate decision maker for an “incapable” individual,
including: (i) the individual’s spouse, unless the individual and spouse
are legally separated; (ii) an adult child of the individual or, if the
individual has more than one adult child, a majority of the adult children
who are reasonably available for consultation; (iii) a parent of the
individual; (iv) if the individual is unmarried, the individual’s domestic
partner; (v) a brother or sister of the individual; and (vi) a “close friend”
of the individual, with “close friend” defined as “an adult who has
exhibited special care and concern for the [individual], who is familiar
with the [individual]’s health care views and desires and who is willing
and able to become involved in the [individual]’s health care and to act
in the [individual]’s best interest.”45
In terms of the standard of decision making, the Arizona Act simply
provides that the surrogate has “the authority to make health care
decisions for the [individual] and . . . shall follow the patient’s wishes if
they are known.”46 The Arizona law does not clarify the standard of
decision making that should apply if the individual’s wishes are not
known, other than to state that a surrogate who is not the individual’s
agent or guardian is not permitted to make decisions to admit the
individual to certain behavioral health facilities under certain
conditions.47
If the health care provider cannot locate any of the persons who are
eligible to serve as a surrogate, the individual’s attending physician may
make a health care treatment decision for the individual after the
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3231 (LexisNexis 2012).
Id. § 36-3231(A).
Id. § 36-3231(A), (D).
Id. § 36-3231(A)(1)-(6).
Id. § 36-3231(A).
Id. § 36-3231(D)-(E).
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physician consults with and obtains the recommendations of an
institutional ethics committee.48 If a consultation with an institutional
ethics committee is not possible, the physician may make a decision after
consulting with a second physician who concurs with the physician’s
decision. Unlike the comprehensive Pennsylvania Act, the Arizona Act
provides no further detail regarding surrogate health care decision
making in the context of adults, including elderly persons, with impaired
decision-making capacity.
The Arizona Act is less desirable than the Pennsylvania Act for
several reasons. First, unlike the Pennsylvania Act, the Arizona Act does
not do a good job of attempting to minimize conflicts of interest by
preventing certain classes of persons from serving as a surrogate. The
only conflict recognized by the Arizona Act is the possibility that a
surrogate might want to admit an elderly individual to a behavioral
health facility when such admission might not be in the interests of the
elderly individual. In addition, the Arizona Act actually allows the
elderly individual’s physician to make a health care decision for the
elderly individual as long as the physician consults with an ethics
committee or, if an ethics committee consultation is not possible, if the
elderly individual consults with a second physician. Because the first
physician or the second physician may have an interest in administering,
withholding, or withdrawing treatment based on whether such
administration, withholding, or withdrawal would be in the physician’s,
hospital’s, or someone else’s financial or other interest, it is possible that
the decision made by the physician will not be in the health interests of
the elderly individual.
Second, the Arizona Act does not establish a detailed process, or
really any process at all, that would help the surrogate in making a
decision that would be in alignment with the elderly individual’s
preferences and values. If the surrogate does not know what the elderly
individual’s wishes are, then the surrogate appears to be able to make
any health care decision for the elderly individual, regardless of whose
interest the decision is in, and there appears to be no oversight of that
decision by any type of independent or third-party monitor.
Third, the Arizona Act suffers from the same problem that the
Pennsylvania Act does in that the Arizona Act prioritizes certain
individuals who may have interests that diverge from the interests of the
elderly individual, over other individuals whose interests may be more

48. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3221(B) (LexisNexis 2012). An “institutional ethics
committee” is defined as a “standing committee of a licensed health care institution
appointed or elected to render advice concerning ethical issues involving medical
treatment.” Id.
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closely aligned with those of the elderly individual. In particular, note
that the Arizona Act prioritizes spouses over children, children over
parents, parents over domestic partners, domestic partners over siblings,
and siblings over close friends. Again, this scheme works extremely
well for elderly individuals who happen to be in legally-recognized
marriages and whose spouses have interests that converge with their
own. The Arizona State Legislature may have codified this priority list
of surrogates due to its belief that more state residents would be in
interest-convergent, legally-recognized marriages and, therefore, that the
default provision would serve more Arizonans than any other default
provision. However, the default provision will not serve everyone.
Again, if an elderly individual does not have a spouse and, instead, has a
domestic partner or close friend whose interests converge with the
elderly individual’s interests, that partner or friend may not have a
chance to make a decision that would be in the elderly individual’s best
interests because another person would have priority over the partner or
friend. If that other person has interests that diverge from the interests of
the elderly individual, the Arizona Act essentially allows the conflicted
person to serve as the surrogate over the unconflicted partner or friend.
In summary, the Arizona Act does not do a good job of identifying
potential conflicts of interest, attempting to minimize such conflicts, or
assisting surrogates in making decisions that would serve the interests of
the elderly individual.
3.

Nevada

Nevada is unique in that it does not even have a default provision
identifying the classes of persons who may provide surrogate consent to
the administration of treatment in the absence of an advanced health care
planning document. That is, if an elderly individual with impaired
decision-making capacity has not executed an advanced health care
planning document and has no guardian, Nevada law simply does not
address whether, or how, a surrogate can consent to the affirmative
provision of health care, whether such care is a medically necessary
diagnostic examination, medical treatment, surgical procedure, or
prescription drug.
However, Nevada does have a default provision that identifies the
classes of persons who may provide surrogate consent to the withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from the individual if the
individual has not executed an advanced health care planning document

2013]

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MEDICINE, RESEARCH, AND LAW

1307

called a “declaration”49 and a guardian has not been judicially appointed
for the individual.50 Codified within Nevada’s Uniform Act on Rights of
the Terminally Ill (“Nevada Act”),51 the provision gives a surrogate the
authority to consent to the withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment from an individual who does not have an effective declaration
and for whom a guardian has not been appointed if the individual has
been determined by the individual’s attending physician to be in a
terminal condition52 and is no longer able to make decisions regarding
the administration of life-sustaining treatment.53
The following classes of persons, in the following order of priority,
may serve as surrogates in Nevada: (i) the spouse of the individual; (ii)
an adult child of the individual or, if there is more than one adult child, a
majority of the adult children who are reasonably available for
consultation; (iii) the parents of the individual; (iv) an adult sibling of the
individual or, if there is more than one adult sibling, a majority of the
adult siblings who are reasonably available for consultation; or (v) the
nearest other adult relative of the individual by blood or adoption who is
reasonably available for consultation.54 The only other relevant provision
in the Nevada Act provides that a decision made by a surrogate to
consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment on
behalf of an individual must be made in “good faith” and that such
consent would not be valid “if it conflicts with the expressed intention of
the patient.”55
The Nevada Act is the least helpful of the three state statutes
surveyed. Because the affirmative administration of health care,
including the performance of medically necessary diagnostic
49. A “declaration” is the name given under Nevada law to the document that an
individual may sign that would appoint another person to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining treatment from the individual in the event the individual is in an incurable and
irreversible condition. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.610-449.611 (2011). Nevada’s
“declaration” is the functional equivalent of other states’ medical powers of attorney or
health care powers of attorney; cf. supra note 12.
50. NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.626(1)(b) (2011); id. § 449.613(2).
51. See id. §§ 449.535-449.690.
52. Nevada defines a “terminal condition” as an “incurable and irreversible
condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion
of the attending physician, result in death within a relatively short time.” Id. § 449.590.
53. Id. § 449.626(1)(a)-(b); see also id. § 449.617 (stating that the declaration
becomes operative when “the declarant is determined by the attending physician to be in
a terminal condition and no longer able to make decisions regarding administration of
life-sustaining treatment”).
54. Id. § 449.626(2). “If a class entitled to decide whether to consent is not
reasonably available for consultation and competent to decide, or declines to decide, the
next class is authorized to decide, but an equal division in a class does not authorize the
next class to decide.” Id. § 449.626(3).
55. Id. § 449.626(4).
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examinations, treatments, and surgical procedures, will be in the interests
of many elderly individuals who are or may be ill, the fact that the
Nevada Act fails to provide legislative authority for a surrogate to
consent to such health care is troubling.
Although the Nevada Act does provide legislative authority for
surrogate consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment, it does so in a manner that, like the Arizona Act, fails to
identify possible conflicts of interest, barely makes an attempt to
minimize such conflicts, and fails to assist surrogates in making
withholding and withdrawal decisions that will serve the interests of the
elderly individual. The criticisms applicable to the Arizona Act apply
with equal force to the Nevada Act.
The only evidence that the Nevada Act contemplated a conflict of
interest might occur is through the statutory provision that provides that a
surrogate, when making a decision to consent to withhold or withdraw
life-sustaining treatment, shall make the decision in “good faith” and that
consent will not be valid “if it conflicts with the expressed intention of
the patient.”56 Stated another way, the Nevada Act recognizes that some
surrogates may act in bad faith, and the Nevada Act technically would
invalidate a bad faith decision, although the Act provides no guidance to
a physician, third-party monitor, or other individual with oversight
regarding how to determine whether a surrogate is acting in bad faith.
The Nevada Act also recognizes that, if the elderly individual happened
to have expressed a preference for the maintenance of life-sustaining
treatment, a decision by a surrogate to withhold or withdraw such lifesustaining treatment would constitute a conflict of interest. However, the
Nevada Act completely ignores the fact that many elderly individuals
with impaired decision-making capacity will have failed to express a past
preference regarding the desirability of life-sustaining treatment and will
have insufficient capacity to express a current preference. In these cases,
the Nevada Act opens the door for a surrogate to make a decision to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment when such decision could
conflict with the unexpressed preferences of the elderly individual.

56.

NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.626(4) (2011).
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CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH

The previous Part compared and contrasted illustrative state laws
governing conflicts of interest in clinical medicine (or, treatment for
shorthand) involving elderly individuals with impaired decision-making
capacity. This Part will compare and contrast illustrative state laws
governing conflicts of interest in human subjects research (or, research
for shorthand). First, however, the concepts of treatment and research
must be distinguished.
Treatment and research are intrinsically different concepts.57
Treatment may be defined as “the provision, coordination, or
management of health care and related services by one or more health
care providers” to a particular individual.58 The definition of treatment is
based on the concept of health care, which has been defined as care,
services, and procedures related to the health of a particular individual.59
Health care is frequently defined to include preventive, diagnostic,
therapeutic, rehabilitative, maintenance, or palliative care that is
provided to a particular individual, as well as counseling, assessments,
and procedures that relate to the physical or mental condition or
functional status of a particular individual.60 Activities are thus classified
as treatment when they involve a health care service provided by a health
care provider that is tailored to the specific preventive, diagnostic,
therapeutic, or other health care needs of a particular individual.61
Research, on the other hand, is defined as a systematic
investigation—including
research
development,
testing,
and
evaluation—that is designed to develop or contribute to generalizable
knowledge.62 Knowledge is considered generalizable when it can be
applied to either a population inside or outside of the population served
57. The introductory text in Part II and accompanying notes 58-75 is taken with
permission and with only technical changes from Tovino, supra note 2, Parts I, IV.
58. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2012) (definition of treatment set forth in the
federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule).
59. See, e.g., id. § 160.103 (definition of health care set forth in the federal HIPAA
Privacy Rule).
60. See, e.g., id.
61. See, e.g., Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,626 (Dec. 28, 2000) [hereinafter HIPAA Privacy Rule] (“The activities
described by ‘treatment,’ therefore, all involve health care providers supplying health
care to a particular patient. While many activities beneficial to patients are offered to
entire populations or involve examining health information about entire populations,
treatment involves health services provided by a health care provider and tailored to the
specific needs of an individual patient.”).
62. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (definition of research set forth in the federal
Common Rule); id. § 164.501 (definition of research set forth in the federal HIPAA
Privacy Rule).
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by the institution conducting the research.63 The purpose of research,
then, is to collect data that will lead to the creation of generalizable
knowledge that may result in the production of new therapies or the
improvement of existing therapies.64
Compared side by side, the differences between treatment and
research become clear. First, the primary purpose of treatment is to
maintain or improve a particular patient’s health, whereas the primary
purpose of research is to gain knowledge that will result in the creation
of new treatments for a class of future patients.65 Second, physicians
providing treatment frequently adjust, substitute, and change therapies to
meet the specific health needs of particular patients.66 Investigators
conducting research, however, must follow approved research protocols
and are not permitted to adjust, substitute, or change the experimental
intervention in response to the wants or needs of a particular
participant.67 Third, a treating physician has a primary duty of loyalty to

63. See, e.g., HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 61, at 82,625.
64. See Rebecca Dresser, The Ubiquity and Utility of the Therapeutic
Misconception, 19 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 271, 272 (2002) (“Although some research
participants may receive a health benefit, research is designed to generate data that could
lead to improved care for future patients.”); id. at 285 (“[I]nvestigators in the research
setting focus primarily on the need to obtain valid scientific data.”); Gail E. Henderson et
al., Clinical Trials and Medical Care: Defining the Therapeutic Misconception, 4 PLOS
MED. 1735, 1737 (2007) (“[T]here is consensus that the defining characteristic of
research is to create generalizable knowledge through answering a scientific question.”);
id. (“Clinical research is designed to produce generalizable knowledge and to answer
questions about the safety and efficacy of intervention(s) under study in order to
determine whether or not they may be useful for the care of future patients.”).
65. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 64, at 285 (“[P]hysicians in the medical setting
seek solely to benefit the patient. In contrast, investigators in the research setting focus
primarily on the need to obtain valid scientific data.”).
66. See id. at 272 (“After treatment begins, medication dosages may be increased if
the patient fails to respond to the standard dosage, or decreased if the patient experiences
unwanted side effects. Patients who fail to improve when taking one medication may be
switched to another one.”).
67. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Clarifying the Ethics of Clinical Research: A Path
Toward Avoiding the Therapeutic Misconception, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 22, 22 (2002)
(explaining that the use of randomization, double-blind procedures, adherence to strict
protocols, and administration of placebos in research studies “may be undertaken because
they advance the scientific validity of the research study, rather than because they serve
the subject”); Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz & Thomas Grisso, Therapeutic
Misconception in Clinical Research: Frequency and Risk Factors, 26 IRB: ETHICS &
HUM. RES. 1, 1 (2004) (explaining that researchers are required to protect the validity of
the data they generate by using techniques such as randomized assignment, placebo
control groups, double-blind procedures, and fixed treatment protocols, which often
preclude personalized decisions from being made); Dresser, supra note 64, at 272
(“Research methods that minimize ambiguity and bias in data collection rule out the
individualized approach that is the hallmark of clinical care. In research, the intervention
an individual receives is usually determined by random assignment instead of a
physician’s clinical judgment.”). Although research participants have a legal right to
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his or her patients and is charged with recommending treatments that the
physician believes to be in each patient’s best interests.68 On the other
hand, researchers who do not also have a treatment relationship with
their research participants are not considered to have a fiduciary or
primary duty of loyalty to their research participants.69 In theory,

withdraw from a research study at any time, they do not have the right to adjust,
substitute, or change an experimental intervention. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (2010).
68. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: OPINION 10.015 (2001),
available at http://bit.ly/10pFfMq. The American Medical Association opines:
The relationship between patient and physician is based on trust and gives rise
to physicians’ ethical obligations to place patients’ welfare above their own
self-interest and above obligations to other groups, and to advocate for their
patients’ welfare. Within the patient-physician relationship, a physician is
ethically required to use sound medical judgment, holding the best interests of
the patient as paramount.
Id.; accord The Hippocratic Oath, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (last visited Mar. 28, 2013),
http://1.usa.gov/sx5h5 (pledging that the physician will “benefit [his or her] patients
according to [his or her] greatest ability and judgment”); TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 173 (5th ed. 2001) (explaining that the
goal of medicine is to promote the welfare of individual patients).
69. See, e.g., Suthers v. Amgen, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 416, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(refusing to find a fiduciary duty running from the sponsor of an independent research
study to the individuals who participated in the research); Greenberg v. Miami Children’s
Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1072 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (refusing to find a
fiduciary duty running from Canavan disease researchers to their research participants);
Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 486 (Cal. 1990) (explaining that the
regents of the defendant university and its affiliated researchers were not physicians and
therefore did not owe the plaintiff patient a fiduciary duty), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936
(1991); Dresser, supra note 64, at 292 (recommending that researchers explain to
participants as part of the consent-to-research process that their primary loyalty is to
future patients, not current research participants). Notwithstanding these cases, some
attorneys who represent research participants continue to assert that the researcherparticipant relationship constitutes a fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., Alan C. Milstein,
Research Malpractice and the Issue of Incidental Findings, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 356,
358 (2008). Milstein states:
Once the research subject or the guardian for a minor subject signs the
informed consent document, a fiduciary relationship is formed between the
[principal investigator] and the research subject. The very nature of scientific
research on human subjects creates special relationships out of which fiduciary
duties arise, similar to the physician/patient relationship. The fiduciary
relationship is formed not only by the informed consent agreement between the
parties, but also by the trust the subject necessarily places in the researcher. In
the context of human subjects research, a special relationship is created
between the human subject and those responsible for the design, approval, and
implementation of the experiment because the latter have a duty to protect
human subjects both under the Common Rule and common law.
Id. In addition, some courts have found that researchers have “special relationships” with
their research participants that can give rise to unspecified tort-like duties. See, e.g.,
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 846 (Md. 2001) (“[S]pecial
relationships, out of which duties arise, the breach of which can constitute negligence,
can result from the relationships between researcher and research subjects.”). See
generally Stacey A. Tovino, Incidental Findings: A Common Law Approach, 15
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investigators design, and research participants consent to participate in,
research protocols with the understanding of the differences between
treatment and research70 and with the knowledge that research
participation may not directly benefit the participant and may pose
personal health and other risks to the participant.71
Human subjects researchers, also called investigators, whose
research is designed to improve clinical practice in the areas of
neurology, psychiatry, geriatrics, emergency medicine, and critical care,
among other specialties, frequently design research protocols that
involve elderly individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.72
Some of these protocols involve the neuroimaging of elderly individuals
who have disorders of consciousness, including coma, vegetative state,
and minimally conscious state.73 Other protocols are designed to
ACCOUNTABILITY RES. 242, 250-54 (2008) (discussing the concepts of fiduciary duty and
fiduciary relationships in the context of neuroimaging research).
70. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1) (2012) (requiring research participants to be
informed that they are participating in research); id. § 46.102 (defining research as a
systematic investigation—including research development, testing, and evaluation—that
is designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge). As discussed in more
detail below, some research participants and researchers may be operating under a
therapeutic misconception.
71. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2) (2010) (requiring research participants to be
informed of reasonably foreseeable risks and discomforts before they may consent to
participate in the research).
72. See, e.g., B. Lynn Beattie, Consent in Alzheimer’s Disease Research:
Risk/Benefit Factors, 34 CAN. J. NEUROLOGICAL SCI. S27, S27 (2007) (noting that
research in Alzheimer’s disease is complicated by the disease itself, which affects the
subject’s decision-making capacity for participation in research); Scott Y. H. Kim et al.,
Assessing the Competence of Persons with Alzheimer’s Disease in Providing Informed
Consent for Participation in Research, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 712, 712 (2001) (noting
that even relatively mild Alzheimer’s disease can significantly impair consent-giving
capacity in the research context and that research in the field of Alzheimer’s disease
therapeutics requires participation by subjects with relatively mild Alzheimer’s disease);
Ukamaka M. Oruche, Research with Cognitively Impaired Participants, 13 J. NURSING L.
89, 89 (2009) (noting that research involving individuals with cognitive impairments is
necessary to improve understanding of illnesses such as Alzheimer’s disease,
Huntington’s chorea, cerebrovascular disease, psychiatric disorders, chronic alcoholism,
and AIDS dementia complex).
73. See, e.g., Martin R. Coleman et al., Towards the Routine Use of Brain Imaging
to Aid the Clinical Diagnosis of Disorders of Consciousness, 132 BRAIN 2541, 2541-52
(2009) (describing the functional brain imaging findings from a group of 41 individuals
with disorders of consciousness who undertook a hierarchical speech processing task and
concluding that functional neuroimaging has the potential to inform the diagnostic
decision-making process for persons with disorders of consciousness); Davinia
Fernandez-Espejo, Combination of Diffusion Tensor and Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging During Recovery from the Vegetative State, 10 BMC NEUROLOGY 1 (2010)
(using functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate cortical responses to passive
language stimulation as well as task-induced deactivations related to the default-mode
network in one patient in the vegetative state at one month post-ictus and twelve months
later when he had recovered consciousness); Joseph J. Fins, Neuroethics, Neuroimaging,
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investigate the safety and efficacy of experimental drugs and other
interventions for elderly individuals who have mild, moderate, or severe
dementia or mental illness and may have restricted or limited decisionmaking capacity.74 Still other protocols, especially those designed to
improve clinical practice in the emergency room, may involve
experimental interventions for elderly individuals with mild, moderate,
or severe traumatic brain injuries.75
If an elderly individual has intact decision-making capacity, the
elderly individual, in theory, can receive information regarding a
research protocol, including the nature of the research and its risks and
possible benefits, and make an informed decision regarding whether to

and Disorders of Consciousness: Promise or Peril, 122 TRANSACTIONS AM. CLINICAL &
CLIMATOLOGICAL ASS’N 336, 339-43 (2010) (reviewing research using functional
magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography to elucidate brain states);
Olivia Gosseries et al., Disorders of Consciousness: What’s in a Name?, 28
NEUROREHABILITATION 3, 5-9 (2011) (summarizing research studies designed to
investigate the residual neural capacity of individuals with disorders of consciousness);
Luaba Tshibanda et al., Neuroimaging After Coma, 52 NEURORADIOLOGY 15, 15-24
(2010) (summarizing research studies using magnetic resonance spectroscopy, diffusion
tensor imaging, and functional magnetic resonance imaging to assess patients with
disorders of consciousness); Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse et al., Default Network
Connectivity Reflects the Level of Consciousness in Non-Communicative Brain-Damaged
Patients, 133 BRAIN 161, 161 (2010) (using functional magnetic resonance imaging to
investigate default network connectivity in individuals with disorders of consciousness,
including coma, vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and locked-in syndrome).
74. See, e.g., Linda Beuscher & Victoria T. Grando, Challenges in Conducting
Qualitative Research with Persons with Dementia, 2 RES. GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING 6,
7 (2009) (discussing consent to research and other challenging issues raised by the
conduct of qualitative research involving individuals with dementia); Sabina Gainotti et
al., How Are the Interests of Incapacitated Research Participants Protected Through
Legislation? An Italian Study on Legal Agency for Dementia Patients, 5 PLOS ONE 1, 1
(2010) (noting that research involving individuals with compromised mental ability can
be ethically challenging due to their impaired ability to give free and informed consent);
Scott Y. H. Kim et al., Surrogate Consent for Dementia Research: A National Survey of
Older Americans, 72 NEUROLOGY 149, 149 (2009) [hereinafter Surrogate Consent]
(noting that research in novel therapies for Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) rely on persons
with AD as research subjects); Robin Pierce, A Changing Landscape for Advance
Directives in Dementia Research, 70 SOC. SCI. & MED. 623, 623 (2010) (noting that one
of the primary challenges to conducting research on dementia is the gradual loss of the
capacity to consent to research participation by individuals with dementia).
75. See Je Sung You et al., Use of Diffusion-Weighted MRI in the Emergency
Department for Unconscious Trauma Patients with Negative Brain CT, 27 EMERGENCY
MED. J. 131, 131 (2010); see also Wusi Qiu et al., Effects of Unilateral Decompressive
Craniectomy on Patients with Unilateral Acute Post-Traumatic Brain Swelling After
Severe Traumatic Brain Injury, 13 CRITICAL CARE R185, R185 (2009) (finding that
unilateral decompressive craniectomy (DC) lowers intracranial pressure, reducing the
mortality rate and improving neurological outcomes over unilateral routine
temporoparietal craniectomy; also finding that DC increases the incidence of delayed
intracranial hematomas and subdural effusion, some of which need secondary surgical
intervention).
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participate in the research. Unlike treatment, however, research
involving even healthy individuals with intact capacity is fraught with
conflicts of interest. Many researchers have financial and other interests
in their research—including sponsorship by pharmaceutical companies—
that result in their recommendation of research studies and aggressive
research recruitment strategies vis-à-vis individuals for whom such
research may not be in their best health interests. As discussed above,
remember that a researcher’s primary purpose in conducting research is
to generate statistically significant data that will produce knowledge that
will contribute to the creation of new treatments for a class of future
patients, not to treat current patients. Also, remember that investigators
conducting research must follow approved research protocols and are not
permitted to adjust, substitute, or change the experimental intervention
(other than to allow the research participant to discontinue participation)
in response to the wants or needs of a particular elderly individual.
Further, remember that, although a treating physician has a primary duty
of loyalty to his or her patients and is charged with recommending
treatments that the physician believes to be in each patient’s best
interests, researchers generally are not considered to have a fiduciary or
primary duty of loyalty to their research participants. In theory,
investigators design, and research participants consent to participate in,
research protocols with the understanding of the differences between
treatment and research, and with the knowledge that research
participation may not directly benefit the participant and may pose
personal health risks to the participant. However, as discussed
elsewhere, it is unclear the extent to which research participants and
researchers understand the differences between treatment and research,
as well as the nature and extent of health risks proposed by research
experiments.76 To summarize thus far, conflicts of interest, especially
between researchers and research institutions on the one hand and
research participants on the other hand, are inherent in research
protocols, even when only healthy individuals participate.
In research protocols involving elderly individuals with impaired
decision-making capacity, the risk of conflicts is even greater. An
elderly research participant with impaired decision-making capacity may
not be able to comprehend information provided about the nature of a
research protocol, as well as its risks and benefits, and may not be able to
make an informed decision regarding whether to consent to research
participation. In this case, if the elderly individual, when competent, did
not execute an advanced research participation document establishing the

76.

See Tovino, supra note 2, Part IV.
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elderly individual’s preferences and providing instructions with respect
to future research participation, federal law and some state laws allow—
as a default—certain classes of persons to provide what is known as
“surrogate” consent to research participation.77
The problem, of course, is that the surrogate decision maker may
have interests that conflict with the interests that the elderly individual
would identify if competent. For example, the surrogate may have a
risk-seeking personality and might wish to enroll the elderly individual in
a physically risky research protocol that has some prospect of direct
therapeutic benefit for the elderly individual even though the individual,
while competent, would have taken a more risk-averse or risk-neutral
approach and would only have participated in low-risk research
protocols, even if such behavior meant missing out on the prospect of
therapeutic benefit. In this case, the surrogate’s interests would be in
conflict with those of the elderly individual. Alternatively, the opposite
scenario might be the case. That is, the surrogate might have a riskaverse personality and might wish to exclude the elderly individual from
participation in a risky research protocol even though the individual,
while competent, would have wished to take on a risk associated with
research that held out the prospect of direct therapeutic benefit. In this
case, too, the surrogate’s interests would be in conflict with those of the
elderly individual.
Research involving elderly individuals with impaired decisionmaking capacity can involve many other types of conflicts of interest.
For example, a surrogate might receive some type of benefit from
enrolling an elderly individual in a research study, such as recruiter or
researcher attention, relief of care-taking responsibilities during the time
that the research experiment takes place, and even small financial or
other incentives or benefits. In all of these cases, the surrogate might
have an incentive to enroll the elderly individual in the research study
even though enrollment might not be in the elderly individual’s health
interests.
Of course, all of the conflicts of interest that apply to research
involving healthy individuals with intact capacity also apply to research
involving elderly individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.
For example, a researcher might be receiving financial compensation for
conducting the research from a pharmaceutical company and, therefore,
may have an incentive to minimize the health risks associated with the
research during informed consent conversations, even though it would be
in the interests of the elderly individual or the surrogate to be made fully

77.

See id. Part II.
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aware of such risks. By further example, researchers have an incentive
to enroll as many participants as possible in their studies in order to
improve their chances of producing statistically significant results even
though the research experiment might not be in the health interests of all
those who are encouraged to enroll.
This Part begins by describing the patchwork of federal and state
laws78 that address the identification and management of these types of
conflicts of interest in the context of surrogate consent to research
participation on behalf of elderly individuals who have impaired
decision-making capacity. In particular, laws from California, Virginia,
and Nevada are used to illustrate an extremely comprehensive, a
moderately comprehensive, and a nonexistent approach, respectively, to
the identification and management of conflicts of interest in the context
of surrogate research participation decision making. This Part concludes
that, although not all conflicts of interest can be eliminated, California
and Virginia do a very good job of attempting to assist in the
identification and management of conflicts of interest in the context of
surrogate research participation decision making. Nevada, on the other
hand, leaves elderly individuals with impaired decision-making capacity
susceptible to conflicted surrogate decision making.
A.

Federal Law

In a previous article, I detailed three decades of policy uncertainty
and failed attempts by the federal government to regulate human subjects
research involving adults with impaired decision-making capacity.79 As
noted in that article, the federal government teetered back and forth for
several decades between the competing goals of fostering cutting-edge
biomedical and behavioral health research and protecting vulnerable
human subjects.80 One result is that federal law still does not contain
specific regulations governing human subjects research involving adults
with impaired decision-making capacity.81
Particular issues on which federal and state policymakers (as well as
researchers and research participant protectionists) disagree include the
following: (i) whether researchers should be required to demonstrate that
78. See infra Part II.A-B; see also Oruche, supra note 72, at 5 (summarizing gaps in
federal and state regulation of human subjects research involving individuals with
cognitive impairments).
79. See Tovino, supra note 2, Part I. See generally Surrogate Consent, supra note
74, at 149-50 (“[P]olicy uncertainties have continued for three decades . . . [b]ecause
policy discussions regarding surrogate-based research have continued for three decades
without a clear resolution.”).
80. See Tovino, supra note 2, Part I.
81. See id. Part I.A.
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a research study classified as minimal risk82 relates to an individual’s
psychiatric, neurological, or other condition before an individual with the
condition is permitted to be enrolled in the research; (ii) whether it is
ever permissible to enroll individuals with impaired decision-making
capacity in research classified as greater than minimal risk and, if so, (A)
whether the greater-than-minimal risk research intervention must hold
out the prospect of direct benefit to the individual, (B) whether the
individual is required to have executed an advance research directive
through which the individual gave prior consent to research participation,
(C) whether a surrogate may consent to the individual’s research
participation in the absence of an advance research directive, and (D)
whether a special standing panel or other similar body that has expertise
in research involving individuals with impaired decision-making
capacity also should be required to review and approve the individual’s
research participation.83
Today, most of these questions remain unanswered at the federal
level. The federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
does have regulations that generally govern the conduct of human subject
research. Known as the “Common Rule,”84 the regulations contain a
“Basic Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects” (“Basic Policy”),
which is codified at Subpart A of the Common Rule,85 as well as special
provisions governing human subjects research involving three sets of
vulnerable populations:
pregnant women, fetuses, and neonates
(“Subpart B”);86 prisoners (“Subpart C”);87 and children (“Subpart D”).88
The Common Rule does not, however, contain a special Subpart
governing research involving adults in general or elderly individuals in
particular with impaired decision-making capacity. As a result, proposed
research that would involve adults with impaired decision-making
capacity must satisfy only the general provisions set forth in the Basic
Policy. One of these general provisions does relate to surrogate consent
to research participation and provides that the institutional review board

82. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2012) (“[M]inimal risk means that the probability and
magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of
themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of
routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.”).
83. See, e.g., Surrogate Consent, supra note 74, at 149 (noting that policies for
surrogate consent for research remain unsettled after decades of debate).
84. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,
512, 44,512 (July 26, 2011).
85. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.124 (2012).
86. Id. §§ 46.201-46.207.
87. See generally id. §§ 46.301-46.306.
88. See generally id. §§ 46.401-46.409.
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(IRB) must ensure that informed consent to research participation has
been obtained from each prospective subject or the subject’s legally
authorized representative (LAR),89 defined elsewhere in the Basic Policy
as “an individual or judicial or other body authorized under applicable
law to consent on behalf of a prospective subject to the subject’s
participation in the procedure(s) involved in the research.”90 The phrase
applicable law is generally thought to refer to state law, although, as
discussed in more detail in Parts II(B)(1)-(3) below, state law on this
topic varies widely when it exists.
In light of the Common Rule’s lack of specific guidance regarding
research involving individuals with impaired decision-making capacity,
several national commissions and federal agencies have issued nonbinding recommendations and responses to frequently asked questions
relating to the conduct of research involving individuals with impaired
decision-making capacity.91 As of this writing, however, HHS has yet to
incorporate these informal recommendations and responses into formal
federal regulations. As a result, the conduct of human subject research
involving elderly individuals with impaired decision-making capacity
remains legally and ethically murky, especially in the context of multistate clinical trials, where more than one state law could govern different
parts of the trial.92
B.

State Law

Although the federal government has yet to issue regulations
governing research involving adult or elderly individuals with impaired
decision-making capacity, some states do have relevant laws, although
these laws vary widely in their application, scope, and regulation when
they exist.93 Below, laws from California, Virginia, and Nevada are used
to illustrate the variety of approaches to surrogate consent to research

89. Id. §§ 46.111(a)(4), 46.116.
90. Id. § 46.102(c) (emphasis added).
91. See Tovino, supra note 2, Part II.A.
92. See Scott Y. H. Kim et al., Proxy and Surrogate Consent in Geriatric
Neuropsychiatric Research: Update and Recommendations, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 797,
797 (2004) (“Despite a wave of initiatives in the late 1990s to clarify policy, surrogate
consent for research continues to be a murky legal area and incapable subjects in the
United States still lack clear regulatory protection.”).
93. See id. at 798 (“Previous reviews of state laws and regulations on proxy or
surrogate consent for research have revealed tremendous heterogeneity. . . .”). See
generally Elyn R. Saks et al., Proxy Consent to Research: The Legal Landscape, 8 YALE
J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 37, 37-39 (2008) (surveying state laws governing consent
to research by legally authorized representatives on behalf of individuals with impaired
decision-making capacity).
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participation and to highlight desirable and undesirable statutory
features.
1.

California

California’s Protection of Human Subjects in Medical
Experimentation Act (“California Act”)94 allows a surrogate to consent to
research participation on behalf of an elderly individual who is unable to
consent, does not have an agent under a health care power of attorney,
and does not have a conservator or guardian, but only if certain criteria
are satisfied.95 First, the surrogate must have “reasonable knowledge of
the subject.”96 Second, the surrogate must be selected from the following
priority-ordered list of persons: (i) the spouse of the individual; (ii) an
individual as defined in Section 297 of the Family Code (a domestic
partner); (iii) an adult son or daughter of the person; (iv) a custodial
parent of the person; (v) any adult brother or sister of the person; (vi) any
adult grandchild of the person; and (vii) an available adult relative with
the closest degree of kinship to the person.97 Third, the elderly
individual must not express dissent or resistance to research
participation.98 Fourth, the research must relate to the cognitive
impairment, lack of capacity, or serious or life-threatening disease and
condition of the individual.99 Finally, the surrogate may not receive
financial compensation for consenting to the elderly individual’s research
participation.100
If these criteria are satisfied, the surrogate shall, in making a
decision whether to consent to research participation on behalf of the
elderly individual, “exercise substituted judgment, and base decisions
about participation in accordance with the person’s individual health care
instructions, if any, and other wishes, to the extent known to the
surrogate decision maker.”101 If the elderly individual did not leave any
instructions and the surrogate does not know the elderly individual’s
wishes, then the California Act provides that the surrogate shall “make
the decision in accordance with the person’s best interests.”102 In
determining the elderly individual’s best interests, the surrogate is
required to consider the elderly individual’s “personal values and his or
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24170-24181 (West 2012).
See id. § 24178(c).
Id.
Id. § 24178(c)(3)-(9).
Id. § 24178(c).
Id. § 24178(b).
Id. § 24178(i).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178(g) (West 2012).
Id.
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her best estimation of what the [individual] would have chosen if he or
she were capable of making a decision.”103
Finally, prior to making a research participation decision on behalf
of the individual, the surrogate shall be fully informed of several matters,
including the name of the sponsor or funding source, if any, of the
research study,104 as well as the existence of any material financial stake
or interest that the investigator or research institution has in the outcome
of the medical experiment.105 The California Act defines “material” as
$10,000 or more in securities, assets, salary, or other income.106
Without an advanced research participation planning document that
specifies an elderly individual’s preferences or instructions regarding
participation in medical experimentation, we can never be sure whether
an elderly individual would want to participate in research. Surrogacy
legislation, such as the California Act, is always going to be second best.
However, like the Pennsylvania Act in the context of clinical medicine,
the California Act does as good a job as possible of attempting to
minimize conflicts of interest in the context of human subjects research
by prohibiting certain persons, including individuals who receive
financial compensation, from serving as surrogates and by establishing a
detailed process that attempts to assist the surrogate in making a research
participation decision that would be in alignment with the elderly
individual’s preferences and values. In particular, if an elderly individual
with impaired decision-making capacity dissents or even expresses
resistance to a medical experiment, the surrogate would be prohibited
from enrolling the individual in a research study, essentially forcing an
alignment of the individual’s and the surrogate’s interests. Additionally,
the California Act, in theory, requires the surrogate to make a decision
that would be in the elderly individual’s best interests and forces the
surrogate to consider the elderly individual’s values and what the
individual would have chosen if he or she were capable of making a
decision.
Also note that the California Act requires the research to relate to
the cognitive impairment, lack of capacity, or serious or life-threatening
disease and condition of the elderly individual.107 The theory here is that
an elderly individual might be more inclined to participate in research
about the condition from which he or she actually suffers. For example,
if the reason the elderly individual has impaired decision-making

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. § 24173(c)(9).
Id. § 24173(c)(11).
Id.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178(b) (West 2012).
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capacity is because the individual has severe Alzheimer’s disease, then
the theory is that the individual might be more inclined to participate in
research relating to Alzheimer’s disease because she could both
empathize with those who have the disease and wish to help others with
the disease and because there is a possibility that she could directly
benefit from the research. On the other side, the California provision
requiring alignment between the research participant’s own health
condition and the topic of the research also prohibits a surrogate who is
personally interested in, for example, dermatology or plastic surgery
research, from enrolling an elderly individual with Alzheimer’s disease
in such research when the research likely would not be in the individual’s
interests.
Unfortunately, it is possible even under the carefully drafted
California Act for a surrogate to make a research participation decision
that is not in accordance with the elderly individual’s preferences and
values. This can happen if the elderly individual did not express her
wishes regarding research participation prior to her incompetency, in
which case all the surrogate would have to do is claim that research
participation would be in the elderly individual’s “best interests” and that
participation would be what the individual would choose if capable of
doing so. For example, if a risky research protocol held out some
prospect of direct medical benefit to the elderly individual, the surrogate
might be able to assert that the prospect of direct medical benefit is in the
individual’s “best interests” and that the elderly individual would have
chosen to take on the risks associated with the research in exchange for
the possible benefit. This could occur even if the elderly individual, at
heart, was a risk-averse or risk-neutral person and would have had an
interest in avoiding any risk, even if such behavior meant losing out on a
chance to benefit medically from the experiment. Note that the
California Act does not clarify who oversees a surrogate’s determination
that research participation would be in the elderly individual’s best
interests. If it is the research team, which obviously has an interest in
conducting the research and enrolling as many participants as possible,
then further conflicts are introduced.
Notwithstanding this flaw, which is the same flaw that exists in the
detailed Pennsylvania Act governing conflicts of interest in clinical
medicine, the California Act also does a good job of requiring
information to be disclosed to surrogates to assist them in identifying
potential conflicts. For example, the California Act requires the
surrogate to be notified during the informed consent process of the
names of sponsors and funding sources, and of the researcher’s financial
interests that exceed $10,000. These provisions attempt to make the
surrogate aware that the researcher has a financial interest in conducting
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the research and that this financial interest may conflict with what would
be in the elderly individual’s best interests. Perhaps the California Act
could go further by requiring this conflict to be expressly stated to the
surrogate, for example: “You should know that a researcher who
receives material financial incentives in exchange for conducting
research has an interest in conducting such research that may conflict
with the best interests of the prospective human subject.”
Like the Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Nevada Acts governing
conflicts of interest in clinical medicine, the California Act establishes a
priority-ordered list of persons who are eligible to serve as an elderly
individual’s surrogate. The list set forth in the California Act is perhaps
superior to the lists discussed in the previous Part for a couple of reasons,
including the fact that the California list requires the person selected to
have “reasonable knowledge of the subject.”108 Although most children,
parents, siblings, and grandchildren would have reasonable knowledge of
the elderly individual for whom they are making a research participation
decision, not all families are close-knit, and the California Act appears to
be attempting to ensure that estranged relatives with interests that diverge
from the elderly individual do not make conflicted decisions.
In addition, note that the list set forth in the California Act places
domestic partners immediately after spouses instead of at the bottom of
the list after a number of other family members, including children,
parents, siblings, and grandchildren. Because an elderly individual could
not legally have both a spouse and a domestic partner, this provision
does result in an elderly individual who has a domestic partner with
convergent interests being at the top of the list of persons who could
serve as the individual’s surrogate. Of course, domestic partners, just
like spouses, can have interests that diverge from those of their legal
partner, in which case the statutory scheme would produce conflicted
decision making. At least, however, the statute allows homosexual
elderly individuals the same nondiscriminatory default—good or bad—
that heterosexual and married elderly individuals have. To make the
default completely nondiscriminatory, I would change the first class of
persons on the list to “spouses or domestic partners” instead of having
“spouses” listed first and “domestic partners” listed second.
Again, the list is not perfect. Any time a person in a higher class
has interests that diverge from the elderly individual when a person in a
lower class has interests that converge with the elderly individual, the
statute could force conflicted decision making. California is assuming
that spouses and domestic partners are more likely to have convergent

108.

Id. § 24178(c).
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interests compared to children, parents, siblings, and grandchildren, and
that may be true for many people, but it will not be true for all.
In summary, the California Act does a good job of attempting to
manage conflicts of interest in the context of surrogate research
participation decision making, but does not remove the possibility of
conflicted decision making entirely.
2.

Virginia

Under Virginia’s Human Research Act (“Virginia Act”),109 consent
to research participation generally must be obtained from the elderly
individual who will be participating in such research.110 However, if the
elderly individual is incapable of making an informed decision regarding
research participation, the Virginia Act does allow a legally authorized
representative (LAR) to consent to research participation on behalf of the
elderly individual.111 In the context of elderly individuals who do not
have an agent under a medical power of attorney and for whom a
guardian has not been appointed, the Virginia Act allows the following
priority-ordered list of persons to serve as LARs: (i) the spouse of the
individual, except where a suit for divorce has been filed and the divorce
decree is not yet final; (ii) an adult child of the individual; (iii) a parent
of the individual; (iv) an adult brother or sister of the individual; or (v)
any person or judicial or other body authorized by law or regulation to
consent on behalf of a prospective subject to such subject’s participation
in the particular human research.112
The Virginia Act does an excellent job of recognizing the
possibility that the LAR and elderly individual might have conflicting
interests regarding research participation. For example, the Virginia Act
clarifies that “[n]o official or employee of the institution or agency
conducting or authorizing the research shall be qualified to act as a[n]
[LAR],”113 which is an attempt to ensure that the financial and other
benefits to the institution of conducting research do not influence the
elderly individual’s research participation. The Virginia Act also
clarifies that, “[n]otwithstanding consent by a[n] [LAR], no person shall
be forced to participate in human subjects research if the investigator
conducting the research knows that the participation in the research is

109. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-162.16–32.1-162.20 (2013).
110. Id. § 32.1-162.18(A)(i).
111. See id. § 32.1-162.18(A)(ii).
112. Id. § 32.1-162.16 (referring to definition of “legally authorized representative,”
criteria (iii)-(viii)).
113. Id. (referring to the definition of “legally authorized representative”).
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protested by the prospective subject”114 Moreover, the Virginia Act
prohibits an LAR from consenting to research participation if the “[LAR]
knows, or upon reasonable inquiry ought to know, that any aspect of the
research is contrary to the religious beliefs or basic values of the
prospective subject, whether expressed orally or in writing.”115 Finally,
the Virginia Act prohibits an LAR from consenting to research on behalf
of an elderly individual if the research would involve nontherapeutic
sterilization, abortion, psychosurgery, or admission for research purposes
to certain hospitals and other health care facilities.116 Although
sterilization and abortion might not be entirely relevant in the context of
elderly individuals, psychosurgery and inpatient admissions certainly
could be.
The Virginia Act also recognizes that the LAR and the elderly
individual could have divergent views regarding the level of acceptable
research-related risk. To this end, the Virginia Act prohibits an LAR
from consenting to nontherapeutic research on behalf of the elderly
individual unless a human research committee determines that such
nontherapeutic research will present no more than a minor increase over
minimal risk to the elderly individual.117
The Virginia Act, although less detailed than the California Act,
does a nice job of attempting to recognize some of the most important
conflicts of interest between research institutions and surrogates on the
one hand, and prospective human subjects who lack capacity on the
other. As discussed above, the Virginia Act recognizes four different
situations in which the LAR and the elderly individual might have
divergent views regarding research participation, including when the
research institution itself wants to be an LAR; when the individual is
protesting research participation; when the research is contrary to the
individual’s known religious views; and when the research involves
controversial interventions such as psychosurgery and inpatient
psychiatric hospital admission. The Virginia Act also does an excellent
job of identifying the concern associated with risk-seeking LARs
attempting to enroll elderly individuals in risky, nontherapeutic research,

114. Id. § 32.1-162.18(A). The Virginia Act clarifies:
In the case of persons suffering from organic brain diseases causing progressive
deterioration of cognition for which there is no known cure or medically
accepted treatment, the implementation of experimental courses of therapeutic
treatment to which a legally authorized representative has given informed
consent shall not constitute the use of force.
Id.
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.18(B) (2013).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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and essentially prohibits LAR consent in such situations, unless the
research presents only a minor increase over minimal risk.
The Virginia Act could be critiqued on the usual grounds. That is,
(i) the Virginia Act’s priority-ordered list of persons who may serve as a
surrogate will not always ensure that the person who is highest on the list
has interests that are convergent with those of the elderly individual; (ii)
the Virginia Act’s priority-ordered list does not include some persons,
such as domestic partners, whose interests may converge with the elderly
individual’s interests; and (iii) because surrogacy legislation is always
less preferential than advanced health care and research participation
planning, the Virginia Act leaves the door open for unscrupulous LARs
to consent to research that is not in the best interests of elderly
individuals who cannot protect themselves due to impaired decisionmaking capacity.
3.

Nevada

Many states do not have any laws that thoroughly govern the
conduct of human subject research, including laws that thoroughly
address whether and how a surrogate may consent to research
participation on behalf of an elderly individual with impaired decisionmaking capacity when advanced research planning has not taken place
and a guardian has not been appointed for the individual.118 Nevada, for
example, has one extremely short provision that simply prohibits a
physician from “performing, without first obtaining the informed consent
of the patient or the patient’s family, any procedure or prescribing any
therapy which by the current standards of the practice of medicine is
experimental.”119 Of note, the provision would appear to allow any
family member to consent to research participation on behalf of an
elderly individual with impaired decision-making capacity when
advanced research planning has not taken place and if the individual does
not otherwise have a guardian, regardless of whether the family member
has interests that conflict with those of the elderly individual. Of course,
given the ethical and legal consequences of such consent, it would be
unwise for an attorney to rely on such a short statutory provision, which
118. See, e.g., SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE. FOR THE
INCLUSION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH IMPAIRED DECISION MAKING IN RESEARCH (SIIIDR)
(2009) [hereinafter SIIIDR RECOMMENDATIONS] (“Very few states specifically define
legally authorized representatives (LARs) for research, and most state’s laws are silent on
the topic. Virtually no state laws address the many ethical issues that arise when LARs
are involved in research decision-making, leaving it to IRBs and institutions to invent
solutions.”).
119. NEV. REV. STAT. § 630.306(6) (2012).
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suggests a lack of knowledge by the Nevada Legislature regarding the
complex ethical and legal issues associated with human subject research.
As discussed elsewhere, in states that lack research-specific laws,
like Nevada, some researchers and research institutions rely on state laws
that govern consent to treatment,120 including laws like the Pennsylvania
Act, the Arizona Act, and the Nevada Act discussed earlier in this article.
Moreover, it is the current policy of the federal Office of Human
Research Protections (OHRP) to permit a surrogate to consent to
research if the surrogate is authorized under state law to consent to the
“procedures involved in the research” under state laws governing consent
to treatment.121 In addition, a federal Subcommittee for the Inclusion of
Individuals with Impaired Decision Making in Research (SIIIDR)
currently recommends, in the absence of a specific state law governing
consent to research, that a surrogate who is designated to make nonresearch health care decisions be ranked second in the priority-ordered
list of persons who are eligible to make research participation
decisions.122 Elsewhere, I argued that legislation governing consent to
treatment should not be used to answer research-related questions due to
the inability of research subjects, surrogates, and sometimes even
researchers to distinguish between the concepts of treatment and
research, resulting in a problem known as “therapeutic misconception,”
and, more generally, the conflicts of interest that are inherent in human
subject research. I incorporate those arguments herein. That is, I
critique states such as Nevada that fail to have proper legislation
governing surrogate consent to research participation because I believe
the lack of such legislation opens the door for elderly individuals with
impaired decision-making capacity to be the subjects of conflicted and
dangerous decision making.123

120. See, e.g., Tovino, supra note 2, Part I; see also OFFICE OF EXTRAMURAL
RESEARCH, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, RESEARCH INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS WITH
QUESTIONABLE CAPACITY TO CONSENT: POINTS TO CONSIDER (Nov. 2009), available at
http://1.usa.gov/X4GvWt (“In most jurisdictions, LAR [legally authorized representative]
appointment processes are not specific to the research setting and institutions rely on the
laws governing the use of LARs for clinical care.”).
121. See, e.g., SIIIDR RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 118, at 8(b) (explaining that,
“[i]n states with laws or regulations that address consent to treatment but do not
specifically consider consent to research, current OHRP [Office for Human Research
Protections] interpretation permits consent to research by individuals authorized under
laws that allow consent to the ‘procedures involved in the research.’”).
122. See id. at 9(a)(ii)(b) (recommending, in the absence of applicable state law, that a
person who is designated to make non-research health care decisions be ranked second in
the priority-ordered list of persons who are eligible to make research participation
decisions).
123. See Tovino, supra note 2, Part IV.

2013]

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MEDICINE, RESEARCH, AND LAW

1327

III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION
This final Part compares and contrasts approaches taken by state
rules of professional conduct for managing conflicts of interest in the
context of legal representation and compares these approaches to the
approaches used in clinical medicine and human subject research. One
purpose of these comparisons is to identify options for managing
conflicts in different professional settings, including clinical medicine,
human subjects research, and law, and to determine whether one
professional setting’s approach is superior to another.
A.

Model Rules of Professional Conduct

The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (“Model Rules”) strictly govern conflicts of interest between
attorneys and clients, including elderly clients with impaired decisionmaking capacity.124 As explained previously in this symposium issue,
the general Model Rule is that an attorney is prohibited from
representing a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict
of interest.125 Under the Model Rules, a concurrent conflict of interest
exists if the representation of one client will be directly adverse to
another client or if there is a significant risk that the representation of one
or more clients will be materially limited by the attorney’s
responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person, or by
a personal interest of the attorney.126 For example, an attorney generally
could not represent both an elderly individual with impaired decisionmaking capacity and the elderly individual’s estranged son who is
contesting the elderly individual’s will because he was not included in it.
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest,
the Model Rules do allow an attorney to represent a client if the
following criteria are satisfied: (i) the attorney reasonably believes that
he or she will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to
each affected client; (ii) the representation is not prohibited by law; (iii)
the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client
against another client represented by the attorney in the same litigation or
other proceeding before a tribunal; and (iv) each affected client gives
informed consent, confirmed in writing.127

124.
125.
126.
127.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2012), available at http://bit.ly/dPaBGm.
Id. R. 1.7(a).
Id. R. 1.7(a)(1)-(2).
Id. R. 1.7(b)(1)-(4).
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In addition to these general rules, and as explained previously in
this symposium issue, the Model Rules also provide specific guidance
for particular situations in which conflicts are especially likely. For
example, the Model Rules prohibit an attorney from entering into a
business transaction with a client or knowingly acquiring an ownership,
possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client
unless: (i) the transaction and terms on which the attorney acquires the
interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by
the client; (ii) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of
seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent legal counsel on the transaction; and (iii) the client gives
informed consent, in writing, to the essential terms of the transaction and
the attorney’s role in the transaction, including whether the attorney is
representing the client in the transaction.128
By further example, the Model Rules prohibit an attorney from
soliciting any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift,
or preparing on behalf of a client an instrument giving the attorney or a
person related to the attorney any substantial gift unless the attorney or
other recipient of the gift is related to the client.129 This rule would of
course prohibit an attorney who is representing an elderly client with
impaired decision-making capacity and who is not related by blood to
such client from preparing a will for the client that gives to the attorney
substantial money or property upon the client’s death.
By still further example, the Model Rules prohibit an attorney from
accepting compensation for representing a client from one other than the
client unless: (i) the client gives informed consent; (ii) there is no
interference with the attorney’s independence of professional judgment
or with the client-attorney relationship; and (iii) information relating to
representation of a client is protected as required under Model Rule
provisions relating to confidential client communications.130 This rule,
of course, would prohibit an attorney who is representing an elderly
client with impaired decision-making capacity from accepting payment
for the legal services provided to the elderly client from the client’s
estranged son, who is seeking to be added to the client’s will.
Note that the Model Rules take a different approach to conflicts in
legal representation than the state laws discussed in Parts I and II of this
article take in regards to conflicts in clinical medicine and human subject
research. That is, the default in the practice of law is that an attorney
128.
129.
130.

Id. R. 1.8(a)(1)-(3).
Id. R. 1.8(c).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) (2012).
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cannot take on a representation when there is a conflict of interest, unless
several criteria, including client consent, have been satisfied. With few
exceptions, the default in clinical medicine and human subject research,
on the other hand, is that a surrogate can consent to the administration,
withholding, or withdrawal of treatment and research participation as
long as the surrogate has considered the individual’s preferences and
values and believes that the surrogate’s decision is in accordance with
those preferences and values. Stated slightly differently, the default in
law is that the activity, i.e., legal representation, cannot take place when
a conflict exists, whereas the default in medicine and research is that the
activity, i.e., consent to treatment or research, can take place because it is
assumed that a conflict of interest does not exist, absent the existence of
a limiting factor, such as an advanced health care or research planning
document or other express statement that the individual did not want to
do what the surrogate is contemplating doing. Stated yet a third way, the
law governing conflicts of interest in the context of legal representation,
at least as set forth in the Model Rules, appears to be more stringent than
the illustrative state laws examined in Parts I and II that govern conflicts
of interest in clinical medicine and human subjects research.
B.

State Law

Although most state rules of professional conduct relating to
conflicts of interest are modeled (with some changes) after the Model
Rule provisions governing conflicts of interest, three sets of state rules
will be quickly examined for the purpose of completeness.
1.

Texas

The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (“Texas
Rules”) are similar to, but more stringent and detailed, and organized
slightly differently, than the Model Rules with respect to the topic of
conflicts of interest. Under the Texas Rules, the general rule is that an
attorney shall not represent opposing parties to the same litigation131 and
that an attorney shall not represent a person if the representation of that
person: (i) involves a substantially related matter in which that person’s
interests are materially and directly adverse to the interests of another
client of the attorney or the attorney’s firm; or (ii) reasonably appears to
be or become adversely limited by the attorney’s or law firm’s
responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the attorney’s

131. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES
http://bit.ly/UpovTq.

OF

PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06(a) (2012), available at

1330

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117:4

or law firm’s own interests.132 However, the Texas Rules permit an
attorney to represent a client in the circumstances described in the second
clause of the preceding sentence if: (i) the attorney reasonably believes
the representation of each client will not be materially affected; and (ii)
each affected or potentially affected client consents to such
representation after full disclosure of the existence, nature, implications,
and possible adverse consequences of the common representation and the
advantages involved, if any.133
Like the Model Rules, the Texas Rules also contain specific
provisions governing particular situations that are likely to give rise to
conflicts of interest, including situations involving attorneys who wish to
act as intermediaries between clients,134 attorneys who wish to enter into
business transactions with clients,135 and attorneys who wish to represent
new clients in matters adverse to previous clients.136
2.

New Jersey

The New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct (“New Jersey
Rules”) are almost identical to the Model Rules governing conflicts of
interest with just a few technical changes. That is, the New Jersey Rules
generally prohibit an attorney from representing a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.137 Under the
New Jersey Rules, a concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (i) the
representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
(ii) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the attorney’s responsibilities to
another client, a former client, or a third person, or by a personal interest
of the attorney.138 Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict
of interest, the New Jersey Rules allow an attorney to represent a client
if: (i) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing,
after full disclosure and consultation; (ii) the attorney reasonably
believes that he or she will be able to provide competent and diligent
representation to each affected client; (iii) the representation is not
prohibited by law; and (iv) the representation does not involve the
assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by

132. Id. R. 1.06(b)(1)-(2).
133. Id. R. 1.06(c)(1)-(2).
134. Id. R. 1.07.
135. Id. R. 1.08.
136. Id. R. 1.09.
137. See N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2012), available at
http://bit.ly/ZuhUXw.
138. Id. R. 1.7(a)(1)-(2).
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the attorney in the same litigation or other proceeding before a
tribunal.139
Like the Model Rules, the New Jersey Rules contain specific rules
governing particular situations in which conflicts are particularly likely
to arise, including, for example, situations in which attorneys are
considering entering into business transactions with clients; situations in
which attorneys are considering preparing, on behalf of a client, an
instrument giving the attorney a substantial gift; and situations in which
attorneys are considering accepting compensation for representing a
client from a person other than the client.140
3.

Nevada

The Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct (“Nevada Rules”) are
also almost identical to the Model Rules and the New Jersey Rules
governing conflicts of interest with just a few technical changes. That is,
the Nevada Rules generally prohibit an attorney from representing a
client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.141
Under the Nevada Rules, a concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(i) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another
client; or (ii) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or
more clients will be materially limited by the attorney’s responsibilities
to another client, a former client, or a third person, or by a personal
interest of the attorney.142 Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent
conflict of interest, however, the Nevada Rules, similarly to the Model
Rules, permit an attorney to represent a client if: (i) the attorney
reasonably believes that he or she will be able to provide competent and
diligent representation to each affected client; (ii) the representation is
not prohibited by law; (iii) the representation does not involve the
assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by
the attorney in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal;
and (iv) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in
writing.143 The Nevada Rules also contain specific rules governing
particular situations in which conflicts are particularly likely to arise
including, for example, situations in which attorneys are considering
entering into business transactions with clients; situations in which
attorneys are considering preparing, on behalf of a client, an instrument

139. Id. R. 1.7(b)(1)-(4).
140. Id. R. 1.8(a), (c), (f).
141. See NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2012), available at
http://bit.ly/114SWmu.
142. Id. R. 1.7(a)(1)-(2).
143. Id. R. 1.7(b)(1)-(4).
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giving the attorney a substantial gift; and situations in which attorneys
are considering accepting compensation for representing a client from a
person other than the client.144
IV. CONCLUSION: CONFLICTS IN MEDICINE, RESEARCH, AND LAW
COMPARED
This final Part compares and contrasts the approaches taken by
illustrative state laws in identifying and managing conflicts of interest in
the context of legal representation to illustrative state laws in the contexts
of clinical medicine and human subject research. One purpose of these
comparisons is to identify options for managing conflicts in different
professional settings and to determine whether one professional setting’s
approach is superior to another.
As discussed in more detail below, this Part finds that the law
imposes more stringent duties relating to the identification and
management of conflicts of interest in the context of legal representation
compared to the contexts of clinical medicine and human subjects
research.
Let us begin by examining whether state laws in each professional
context actually recognize and explicitly refer to the concept of “conflict
of interest.” The three state laws discussed in Part III addressing legal
representation all recognize that attorneys may have interests that
conflict with their clients. Each state law has a separate rule or rules
(i.e., Texas Rules 1.07, 1.08, and 1.09; New Jersey Rules 1.7 and 1.8;
and Nevada Rules 1.7 and 1.8) governing conflicts of interest that
identifies the concept of a conflict of interest, that defines the activities
and relationships that constitute a conflict of interest, and that generally
prohibits an attorney from taking on any representation when a conflict
of interest exists. On the other hand, the state laws discussed in Parts I
and II relating to clinical medicine and human subject research do not do
this. Without using the language of “conflict of interest,” a few of the
state laws discussed in Parts I and II, including the Pennsylvania Act, the
Arizona Act, the California Act, and the Virginia Act, implicitly
recognize that certain individuals may have a financial or other interest
that diverges from those of the patient or human subject. However, note
that even the comprehensive Pennsylvania Act, Arizona Act, California
Act, and Virginia Act do not use the language of “conflict of interest.”
These state laws do not have separate provisions identifying, defining,
listing, or describing the possible conflicts of interest. Instead, they
simply (and quietly) identify a few situations in which certain classes of

144.

Id. R. 1.8(a), (c), (f).
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persons cannot serve as another individual’s surrogate. The trained
health law professor or health care attorney will recognize the statutes for
what they are: an understated attempt to limit conflicted surrogate
decision making. To the untrained eye, however, the statutes do not
specifically recognize, highlight, or otherwise make the reader aware that
the relationships between and among physicians and investigators,
surrogates, and patients and human subjects are fraught with potential
conflicts of interest.
Second, with the exception of the California Act discussed in Part
II, which does require disclosure by the researcher to the surrogate of
certain financial interests (although these are not labeled conflicts of
interest), note that the illustrative state laws discussed in Parts I and II do
not require express disclosure and waiver of conflicts of interest. For
example, the Virginia Act does not require a prospective human subject
or a surrogate to be given a document that contains a section called
“Conflicts of Interest” that identifies or lists all of the situations in which
a researcher or research institution might have interests that diverge from
those of the elderly individual whose research participation is being
encouraged. Without such a disclosure, an unsophisticated human
subject and/or surrogate might not make the connection between the
receipt of financial compensation by a researcher from a pharmaceutical
company and the creation of an incentive on the part of that researcher to
enroll human subjects into the research sponsored by the pharmaceutical
company, even though such research might not be in the subject’s best
health interests.
Third, note that the illustrative state laws discussed in Parts I and II
of this article take a different approach to the management of conflicts of
interest. That is, the default in the practice of law is that an attorney
cannot take on a representation when there is a conflict of interest, unless
several criteria, including labeling and disclosure of the interest as a
“conflict of interest” and client consent to the conflict of interest,
confirmed in writing, have been satisfied. With few exceptions, the
default in clinical medicine and human subject research, on the other
hand, is that a surrogate can consent to the administration, withholding,
or withdrawal of treatment and research participation as long as the
surrogate has considered the individual’s preferences and values and
believes that the surrogate’s decision is in accordance with those
preferences and values. Stated slightly differently, the default in law is
that the activity, i.e., legal representation, cannot take place when a
conflict exists, whereas the default in medicine and research is that the
activity, i.e., consent to treatment or research, can take place because it is
assumed that a conflict of interest does not exist unless there is an
advanced health care or research planning document or other express
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statement that the individual did not want to do what the surrogate is
considering doing.
Finally, note that the conflicts of interest that can arise due to the
lack of advanced health care and research participation planning in the
contexts of clinical medicine and human subjects research are as
substantively concerning, if not more so, than the conflicts of interest
that arise during the provision of estate planning, retirement planning,
and long-term care planning. Elsewhere in this symposium, an author
has expressed concern that Social Security benefits may be paid to a
representative whose interests diverge from the interests of the actual
Society Security beneficiary.145 A second author has expressed concern
that, when elderly parents enter into marriages that are unprotected by
law, conflicted distributions may be made.146 Concerns relating to
inappropriate Social Security payments and unintended distributions are
no laughing matter. However, concerns relating to the inappropriate
withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment, or consent to a
risky medical experiment, which may result in serious injury or death,
are at least equally concerning.
For these reasons, this article joins the already robust law review
and other literatures that urge advanced health care and advanced
research participation planning to minimize conflicts of interest that
could arise when a surrogate, in the absence of a formally appointed
agent or guardian, would like to consent to the administration,
withholding, or withdrawal of treatment or consent to research
participation on behalf of an elderly individual with impaired decisionmaking capacity. As such, this article hopefully serves as a nice
capstone to the other pieces in this symposium by providing yet another
reminder that legal planning, even with the conflicts of interest identified
by the other authors in this symposium, is almost always superior to the
lack of planning.
This article also, however, proposes a novel solution for health care
and research-related conflicts: state laws governing conflicts of interest
in clinical medicine and human subject research should consider
borrowing approaches to conflicts management that are set forth in state
rules of attorney professional conduct. Such approaches include, but are
not limited to, the establishment of: (i) special statutory provisions
specifically governing “conflicts of interest,” much like those set forth in

145. See Reid K. Weisbord, Social Security Representative Payee Misuse, 117 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1257 (2013).
146. See Lynne Marie Kohm, Why Marriage Is Still the Best Default in Estate
Planning Conflicts, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1219 (2013). For a discussion of the other
articles in this symposium issue, see Pearson, supra note 1.
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Texas Rules 1.07, 1.08, and 1.09; New Jersey Rules 1.7 and 1.8; and
Nevada Rules 1.7 and 1.8; (ii) content within such statutory provisions
that requires identification and description of the types of conflicts of
interest that can arise in clinical medicine and human subjects research;
(iii) content within such statutory provisions that explains in lay
terminology why such conflicts of interest can be harmful to the health
(including death, serious injury, and illness) and other interests of the
patient or human subject; and (iv) content within such statutory
provisions that requires disclosure and waiver of such conflicts, as
appropriate.

